An increasingly large literature on patronage has developed within political science in recent years. Yet this body of scholarship has heretofore failed to explain variation in patronage allocation across countries. Here I develop such a theory based on the logic of institutional choice, whereby political leaders allocate patronage in accordance with the varying political threats they face. I explicate two variables which capture this variation, namely geography and visibility, and show how they explain patronage allocation. I test this theory through the comparative analysis of Rwanda and Uganda, whose current regimes are remarkably similar in origin and structure. I also extend my analysis to previous regimes in both countries. In all cases I find strong support for my theory.
Introduction
In recent years there has been an increased emphasis in political science on the importance of patronage as a mechanism by which politicians build and maintain political support. As such, a rapidly growing literature on patronage has attempted to understand how, why, where and when politicians allocate material incentives to their constituencies. Recent scholarship, for instance, has focused on the relationship between corruption, economic development, democratization and patronage; whether politicians target patronage at "swing" or "core" voters; how politicians and voters overcome commitment problems; and why or whether politicians target their own ethnic group for patronage. 3 However, within this literature there has been minimal interest in exploring variations in the types of patronage politicians employ, or why and how the nature of patronage distribution varies across regimes. This paper thus discusses patronage as a series of "institutional choices" or strategies which hinge upon a series of trade-offs. 4 Specifically, I argue that patronage variation can be explained by the nature of political threats to politicians which vary across time and space. I explicate two variables which capture this variation in political threats, namely geography and visibility, and show how they explain patronage allocation. In so doing I attempt to understand why politicians might choose to allocate patronage in a state's periphery versus its center, and why the patronage that is distributed can vary between being very visible and obvious to being practically invisible and secretive in nature.
In order to understand this variation I take the two case studies of contemporary Rwanda and Uganda. Rather than employ a large-N quantitative analysis, I use a small-N comparative approach as it is better in understanding the causality behind patronage allocation, a process which is often complicated and secretive and therefore not easily quantifiable. Rwanda and Uganda are ideal case studies for this approach because, despite an unusually high degree of similarities in the current regimes of these two countries, the allocation of patronage across both states is strikingly different. I show below that, in accordance with my theory, current patronage in contemporary Rwanda is centralized and relatively invisible while it is peripheral and highly visible in contemporary Uganda.
In the rest of the paper I first introduce a typology of patronage before examining the two case studies of Rwanda and Uganda. After a detailed assessment of the current Kagame and Museveni regimes I extend my analysis to previous regimes in each country, where examinations of counterfactual or "off-path" behavior confirm my argument. Finally, I conclude with wider thoughts on the study of patronage in general as well as the allocation of patronage in Africa more specifically.
An Institutional Choice Typology of Patronage
Patronage is a universal form of politics, whereby political rulers allocate material benefits to a select group of citizens in return for political support. 5 Inasmuch as patronage allocation is governed by 4 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 5 Despite their confusion in the literature, it is important to distinguish patronage, which is generally not illegal, from corruption, which is considered illegal inasmuch as it involves politicians both allocating and receiving material benefits. It a set of rules and established practices, it is thus a type of institution along the lines established by Douglass North. 6 Moreover, inasmuch as rulers are the ones who decide when, where and to whom they will allocate patronage, their institutional choices are governed by the desire "to maximize their individual political power… by designing institutions that will allow them to exercise their power to the greatest extent possible. They will prefer institutions that make them more powerful rather than less." 7 We should therefore expect rulers to choose patronage strategies that will maximize their power and maintain them in office, 8 which suggests that rulers will have different strategies depending on which threats they face to their power.
Yet, despite a growing literature on patronage, there have been remarkably few attempts at developing theories to explain patronage variation across time and space. 9 This lacuna should not, however, be surprising, considering the more general focus of scholars in the New Institutionalism paradigm on institutions as independent rather than dependent variables. 10 While a new set of literature has more recently attempted to explain why various political rulers choose one set of institutions over another based on a variety of pre-existing conditions, much of this literature has been focused on the post-communist transition in eastern Europe and has therefore largely been concentrated on market and electoral reforms at the expense of other issues. 11 As such, here I develop two variables which can help to explain patronage variation, namely geography and visibility, which I explain in order; I later argue through the case studies why other potential variables cannot explain this variation.
is also important to distinguish patronage, which can take the form of "pork" or club goods that are targeted towards specific groups of citizens and are therefore (at least de facto) excludable, from the allocation of pure public goods, which by definition are non-excludable. Clientelism, on the other hand, appears to be merely a synonym for patronage in much of the literature and thus I do not consider it here. For more on these definitions see Stokes, "Political Clientelism." 6 
Geography
One choice faced by rulers in the distribution of patronage is geographical, whereby they can hand out patronage at the center of their state or in the rural periphery. The advantage of the former is spelled out in the old adage, "keep your friends close but your enemies closer": 12 in other words, provide your political enemies with patronage to keep them from rebelling while also keeping an eye on them. Such a strategy involves the distribution of patronage in the state capital, thereby encouraging provincial rivals to leave their rural source of power behind. The classic practitioner of this strategy was King Louis XIV of France, who drew together his nobles at the court of Versailles in order to prevent a recurrence of the Fronde and other provincial revolts that preceded his rule. 13 However, there are at least three problems with this strategy. First, patronage that goes to the center will trickle down to peripheral citizens, most likely through their ethnic "delegates" at the center. This strategy, however, requires an enforcement mechanism between urban migrants and their rural brethren, and when this mechanisms fails or is non-existent and patronage does not trickle down, poor citizens in the periphery will often take up arms in revolt, as arguably took place in Mali and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. 14 A second problem is a risk that, once clients are "hooked" on patronage and a state fully suffers from what Jean-Paul Azam calls the "redistribution syndrome," those who receive less patronage than others can become angry and threaten the government. Indeed, the oft-heard claim from coup d'etat leaders that the previous regime was "tribalistic" or "corrupt" is merely another way of saying that patronage was unequally distributed across society. For example, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's relative parity of patronage distribution in Côte d'Ivoire allowed him to rule in peace up to his death 12 While this phrase is most famously uttered in the film The Godfather, Part II (1974), its origins lie in Sun-Tzu's The Art of War (6 th century BC). 13 A third and final problem with patronage at the center is that a sudden drop in patronage can lead to instability as clients grow angry and rebel against their former patrons. Once they had decided their patrons were more a burden than a benefit, these clients could use the commercial networks and links they had formerly established to fund and launch insurgencies, as seen in the collapse of such regimes as Doe's Liberia, Barre's Somalia and Mobutu's Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo; DRC), among others. 16 An alternative approach to the centralized model is thus for a government to create patronage in the rural periphery, where clients cannot threaten to overthrow the regime in power. While this strategy is politically safer for the government, its downside is that clients are free to develop independent sources of power in the countryside and potentially form secessionist or rebel movements. For instance, Barrington Moore notes how such a concern among India's Mogul emperors led them to frequently shift bureaucratic assignments despite the subsequent rural instability that these policies produced. 17 More recently the Afghani warlords Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan developed their own armies and links with neighboring Uzbekistan and Iran, respectively, before the overthrow of the Taliban; as a result, President Hamid Karzai appointed Dostum and Khan to largely ceremonial posts in Kabul so as to neutralize their ability to threaten his rule from the periphery. 18 Thus, to summarize, in states where secession, rebellion or invasion is not a worry or where peripheral areas do not threaten the center, we should expect leaders to employ patronage in the periphery rather than the center. Conversely, where the periphery poses a political challenge to the center, we should expect leaders to centralize patronage. 15 Ibid., p. 215. 16 A second trade-off is in the visibility of patronage, whereby the patron can choose to utilize patronage that is either visible to the general public or unknown to others beyond the recipient. Where politicians face serious political competition they have incentives to use public resources or policy concessions to win elections or maintain support, 19 whereby their spending often takes the form of public goods that are both observable or measurable and whose benefits are easy to trace back to the politicians who created them. 20 In particular "pork" or club goods -i.e., patronage that is publicly and legally allocated to a select group of citizens in the form of government policies 21 -are highly visible, inasmuch as they are "clearly seen as evidence of political patrons fulfilling their promises to clients." 22 Moreover, inasmuch as politicians in competitive democracies have short time horizons, there are more incentives for them to pursue short-term policies like pork that will win them the next election. As such, evidence abounds of highly visible public projects that developing world politicians have utilized to win elections, including state farms in Ghana and Nigeria, 23 sugar factories and port facilities in Côte d'Ivoire, 24 wells in Pakistan, 25 drought relief programs in Botswana 26 and, perhaps most famously, food distribution programs in post-independence India, 27 among others. In all of these cases, however, the level of visibility is contingent upon the media, whose coverage of a policy can greatly alter the 19 influence it has on voters. Indeed, recent scholarship has shown how both the media and competitive elections push governments to spend money on club or public goods rather than on private goods. 28 However, as political competition decreases, the pressures for redistribution diminish as well, since politicians have less of a need to curry votes from the public. In states with non-competitive elections and low levels of press freedom there is thus obviously more of an incentive for politicians to provide private goods, or "spoils," 29 to their rivals in order to maintain their support. As opposed to the club goods or pork in competitive democracies, here patronage primarily consists of politicians offering jobs. In particular, according to Robinson and Verdier, 30 the allocation of jobs is useful as it is reversible, thus getting around the problem of how to ensure long-term political support. Indeed, the problem with pork in this setting is that, once it has been created, it cannot be withdrawn from ungrateful clients.
Thus patronage in this sense is personalized and not always legal, and as a result usually fails to have a paper trace. As with club goods, evidence abounds, but perhaps one classic example from Mobutu's Zaire can suffice here. When the Kabila government's aptly-named Office of Ill-Gotten Gains (OIGG) attempted to locate his estimated $8 billion fortune, it only managed to find $4 million in his Swiss bank accounts. The rest of the money, it seemed, had been distributed as patronage, but a lack of records meant that any attempts of the OIGG to track down who received what was largely hopeless. 31 In summary, according to this logic, leaders in competitive democracies with a free press should be more likely to employ easily visible types of patronage, or pork, as they seek to win their next election, while leaders in states without competitive elections and a free media would more likely rely upon less visible or permanent types of patronage. Phrased another way, politicians with high discount rates have an interest in employing visible project-based patronage that could bring them a large one-off benefit, rather than a series of more modest long-term gains. Conversely, when politicians are better 28 able to plan for the future due to a weak opposition, we should expect them to employ less visible types of patronage like state jobs, tariffs and taxes that they can (threaten to) withdraw from unworthy clients. Table 1 recapitulates the two institutional strategies listed above, along with examples of what types of patronage comprise each strategy.
Empirical Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda
[Insert Table 1 explains how both leaders have allocated patronage but also explains patronage variation under previous regimes in both countries.
Background Information on Rwanda and Uganda
As indicated in Table 2 elections under majoritarian rules (in 2003 and 1996, respectively), which they and their parties overwhelmingly won. In both cases the new constitutions mandated for the first time significant minority representation in the parliament, especially for women but also for youth and the disabled. 39 Post-conflict reconstruction in both countries, as well as efforts at post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda and successful HIV/AIDS policies in Uganda, have drawn large amounts of praise and aid from donors and visits from US Presidents Clinton and Bush. As such both leaders were for a while dubbed members of the "new breed" of African leaders that were supposed to lead Africa to a new era of democracy and development. 40 Yet despite holding a number of elections, both countries have authoritarian tendencies and therefore fit into the recently-created category of "semi-democracies" or "anocracies." 41 In both cases opposition politicians are regularly arrested and power remains in a small series of concentric groups within each government: in Uganda power rests in the Banyankole ethnic group (10% of the population), and within it in the hands of the Bahima sub-group, while in Rwanda Tutsis (14% of the population) dominate in the government, with more power concentrated in the akazu (little house) of Ugandan-born Tutsis. 42 In other words, in the terminology of Bueno de Mesquita et al., 43 the size of both Kagame and Museveni's "winning coalition" is small in comparison to the size of their "selectorates," which in both cases is synonymous with the electorate.
The Institutional Logic of Patronage in Rwanda and Uganda
Despite these similarities, however, Kagame and Museveni have employed strikingly different strategies of patronage allocation. These supposed inconsistencies, however, can be explained by the institutional constraints of each country's political and economic endowments. I now return to the two sets of institutional choices detailed above, before examining how each president has utilized patronage to his advantage.
Geography
Above I concluded that rulers that were unconcerned about political threats from the periphery but were concerned about potential rebellions from the center would tend to allocate patronage in peripheral areas, and vice-versa. Uganda, despite verbal threats of secession from southern political leaders in the 1960s and northern politicians today more recently, does not have a serious history of secession or peripheral rebellion that has threatened the center. 44 fighting. This long history of invasion from three different neighboring countries, the threat of ALIR and its successors, the presence of a hostile neighbor only 80 km from Kigali, and Kagame's own successful history in leading an invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, all suggest that Kagame would be concerned about the allocation of patronage in peripheral Rwanda that might fall into the hands of his enemies. In other words, we would expect to see more centralized patronage in Rwanda and more peripheral patronage in Uganda.
Visibility
The logic above suggested that rulers in competitive democracies with a free press would employ more visible patronage, or pork, in order to win elections, while their counterparts in less competitive states with fewer press freedoms would allocate patronage less visibly. Here again we see a marked contrast between Uganda and Rwanda, which have very different histories of political competition. The nature of each country's social composition has much to do with this difference: some 85% of the Rwandan population is Hutu, making it possibly the most ethnically homogenous country in Africa. 45 Uganda, on the other hand, has a claim to the title of the most ethnically fractionalized country in the world, 46 with the largest ethnic group, the Baganda, only comprising some 17% of the population. Similarly and just as important in many ways, Rwanda has been dominated since colonial times by Catholics, who currently account for 57% of the population, with the rest of the population splintered among a number of different religious groups. Uganda, on the other hand, has historically been split between Catholics (currently 42% of the population) and Anglicans (36%), 47 with the latter assuming national power after independence thanks in part to British support.
Thus it is no surprise that Rwanda has had a post-independence history of single-party dominance; its sole multi-party election took place before independence in 1961, when the Hutu Catholic PARMEHUTU party secured 77.7% of the vote. However, even before independence Uganda was politically split between the Protestant Uganda People's Congress and the Catholic Democratic Party, which had fierce electoral battles in the first two post-independence elections of 1962 and 1980.
In the latter case the election was largely assumed to be stolen by Milton Obote, whose brazenness in Finally, there is also a large contrast between Rwanda and Uganda in their levels of press freedom. Rwanda has one of the lowest levels of press freedom in the world: the government has regularly suspended newspapers and radio broadcasts -including the BBC Kinyarwanda service -and has routinely arrested and expelled numerous local and foreign journalists, respectively. With only one daily newspaper -the government-run New Times, which is published in English and has a circulation of only 5000 copies per day -and one television station, Rwandans have remarkably little access to information about their government and are thus ill-placed to respond to visible patronage. In contrast, Uganda has a moderately high level of press freedom in comparison to other African countries: its two most popular newspapers have a combined circulation of 75,000 copies per day, and several other magazines, newspapers and television stations are published or broadcast in a variety of languages. 50 Thus, as a result of Rwanda's relative lack of political competition and press freedom compared to Uganda, we would thus expect to see more visible patronage in Rwanda than in Uganda.
Patronage in Current Rwanda and Uganda
48 Gandhi and Przeworski. 49 Kagame's time in office currently marks the median tenure for Rwandan presidents. 50 Reporters without Borders (RWB) has consistently lowered Rwanda's global annual ranking from 107 th in the world in 2002 to 157 th in 2009, or the fourth-worst in Africa. Uganda, however, has consistently been ranked in the upper half of African countries in RWB's rankings. For more see http://en.rsf.org/.
I now examine the actual use of patronage in contemporary Rwanda and Uganda to see if it conforms to my theoretical predictions. To recall, I predicted that patronage in Rwanda would be centralized and relatively invisible, while in Uganda it would be peripheral and visible. As I now show, the evidence conforms very well with these predictions, as it also does regarding the changing nature of patronage over the length of Museveni's reign in Uganda. the number of provinces from 12 to 5, districts from 106 to 30, sectors from 1536 to 416 and cells from 9135 to 2148; it also cut the number of vice-mayors per district from three to two.
Rwanda

Patronage distribution in
Finally, Kagame's provision of central government jobs have been relatively invisible as well,
with very little public focus on patronage as a means to garner votes. For instance, in 2003 Kagame ran his presidential campaign on non-distributive issues like security, stability, reconciliation and economic recovery. 54 Similarly, the 2008 parliamentary election similarly focused on general government achievements such as stopping "the genocide, rebuilding the country, promoting unity and reconciliation, providing for the genocide survivors, increasing overall healthcare [and] promoting regional integration." 55 The election was notable for the paucity of campaign posters, restricted campaign finance expenditures and a general lack of information about party programs, all of which served to leave voters relatively uninformed about specific government policies. 56
Uganda
In recent years Uganda has seen a very different system of patronage than in Rwanda. While The kingdoms and new districts have been very visible as well. The restoration of the kingdoms in 1993 drew international attention, and each kingdom has focused on local development projects within its area. Uganda's decentralization program has brought prominence to local governments by 60 Inasmuch as the kingdoms and the districts created under Museveni "incorporate potential opposition forces, investing them with a stake in the ruler's survival," they are thus highly comparable to the use of partisan legislatures by autocrats analyzed by Gandhi and Przeworski, p. 1280. The only real difference here is that I claim that the kingdoms and districts are themselves a form of patronage, rather than a means to create patronage as in Gandhi and Przeworski. The end effect, however, is the same. 61 Elliott D. Green, "Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda," Studies in Comparative International Development, 45 (2010), 83-103. While Museveni has also expanded the number of ministries and presidential advisors since the 1990s, these posts are both few in number in comparison to those created through the restored kingdoms and new districts, and remain largely targeted towards his fellow Banyankole. Cf. Giovanni Carbone, No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 66-67. 62 The expansion in the number of Parliamentarians due to the Women MPs from the new districts has merely brought Uganda into line with other countries: with one Parliamentarian per 101,473 citizens in 2010, it has proportionally exactly the same number as Rwanda (101,380). While both countries have proportionally more Parliamentarians than the DRC, Kenya or Tanzania, they have fewer than Burundi, Mozambique, Sudan, or Zambia. reallocating power over public land from the center to the districts, and regular local elections mean that leadership positions within the districts, as with kingdoms, are not decided from Kampala. Moreover, both kingdoms and districts are not reversible like central government jobs inasmuch as the government has never even threatened to abolish a kingdom or a district. Finally, in contrast to Rwanda, Museveni and NRM candidates have prominently reminded voters of the restoration of the kingdoms and the creation of new districts in numerous parliamentary and presidential elections. 63
Historical Extensions and Counterfactuals
The point of the "most similar" comparative research design is to demonstrate that the two cases are almost identical with the exception of dependent variable and the crucial independent variable, thereby isolating and clarifying causality. 64 Of course, what this approach suggests is that the same causal explanation should apply when the cases are not so similar; in the current context, this would mean that patronage allocation in Rwanda and Uganda should not only conform to the theory developed above under the regimes of Kagame and Museveni but also under previous rulers as well. Here I briefly examine four previous regimes in Rwanda and Uganda whose allocation of patronage and subsequent success or failure at maintaining themselves in power clearly demonstrates support of my theory.
In Rwanda the pre-genocide regime of Juvenal Habyarimana was quite successful at allocating patronage to maintain its hold on power. On the one hand Habyarimana claimed at least to be interested in the allocation of patronage to the countryside, with positive references to agriculture and the Hutu peasantry in his speeches. 65 However, as with Kagame Habyarimana centralized power in Kigali rather than the countryside, using his coffee revenues to buy off his opposition in Kigali while also channeling large amounts of state resources to Hutu elites from his home region of Gisenyi.
Indeed, despite claims in 1974 that development policy would be decentralized to the communes, Habyarimana instead increasingly centralized control over local government personnel and policy in Kigali. 66 As regards ethnicity, Habyarimana hired many Tutsis as cabinet ministers, ambassadors and as senior members of his MRND party. In accord with the theory here, however, Habyarimana allowed Tutsis no remit in the countryside, with "an almost total absence of Tutsis from the organs of the local state: [in 1990 ] there was only one Tutsi prefect, the prefect of Butare who was killed in the genocide, and not a single Tutsi burgomaster." 67 Habyarimana's loss of control from the late 1980s onwards thus had arguably less to do with patronage politics than it had do with the collapse of international coffee prices, the winds of change blowing through Francophone Africa, the imposition of a Structural Adjustment program in 1990, the end of the Cold War and the invasion of the RPF, which consisted of Tutsi exiles whose allegiance Habyarimana was unable to purchase. 68 In Uganda, Idi Amin's rule conformed to the Museveni pattern of decentralized patronage but, as his regime had no competitive elections and little freedom of the press, patronage was largely invisible and personalized. While Amin was notorious for almost exclusively appointing his fellow citizens from West Nile region to top positions in the military and government, he was able to maintain himself in power by creating three new sources of patronage that he could allocate to his political rivals.
First, in 1972 he notoriously exiled the country's Asian community, thereby opening up a great deal of patronage resources. Rather than centralize these assets by resting them in government hands, Amin instead quickly redistributed some 3000-4000 former Asian businesses within only three months, thereby creating a new class of businessmen known as the mafutamingi (Swahili for "a lot of fat"). 69 Secondly, in 1973 he introduced a whole new provincial tier of regional government, numbering ten across the whole country, while also nearly doubling the number of districts from 19 to 37. As under Museveni these new provinces and districts allowed Amin to placate his political rivals and remove them from Kampala at the same time; 70 however, unlike Museveni Amin did not allow for local elections or decentralize power, decision-making or resources to these new administrative units, thereby making them useful as patronage posts or "prebends" but hardly visible or useful to most Ugandans. Another way to test the theory presented here is to examine counterfactuals or "off-the-path" behavior by politicians that led to adverse consequences. 71 Here again the evidence is strong. As The Obote regime in the early 1960s represents a similar example of "off-the-path" behavior from Uganda. Obote made the mistake of centralizing patronage, most notoriously by abolishing Uganda's southern Bantu-speaking kingdoms and all regional and district assemblies across the country in 1967. In his attempt to copy Julius Nyerere's ujamaa policies in Tanzania, Obote announced the partial nationalization of some 80 major companies in his so-called "Move to the Left," whose rhetoric indicated that future policies were more likely to include the nationalization of land and large-scale government redistribution of income than the distribution of club goods. Included among these policies was Obote's notorious "one plus three" election proposal for the never-held parliamentary elections of 1971, which required putative MPs in a given constituency to receive a base amount of support in three other constituencies in other parts of Uganda and thereby disadvantaged MPs who only had local support. All of these moves thus threatened local patronage networks, especially among the Baganda who stood to lose the most from Obote's policies. Despite efforts to build an inclusive cabinet and bureaucracy with citizens from all of Uganda's regions, Obote was nonetheless overthrown by Amin in a widely-supported coup in 1971.
Conclusion
In this article I created a typology of patronage as a series of institutional choices or strategies along two variables, namely geography and visibility. I showed how similar regimes in Rwanda and Habyarimana's and Amin's regimes, and why off-path behavior in Kayibanda's and Obote's initial post-independence regimes contributed in both cases to their fall from power. I conclude here with three lessons for the study of patronage. One lesson is that the nature of patronage allocation can have little to do with regime type and economic development but much to do with the different threats to political power across time and space. The evidence here suggests that geographical factors play a large role in deciding where political leaders allocate patronage, and it emphasizes the role of competitive elections and the media in altering the decision of politicians to create visible vs. invisible patronage. It thus suggests that the level of democracy as measured by Polity IV and others may not be the most important factor in explaining patronage distribution, thereby adding to a growing literature that suggests that democracies and non-democracies in the developing world have fewer policy differences that was previously thought. 73 Further research into the differences between countries which have varying levels of political competition and press freedom alongside different political geographies might therefore help to bring their patronage strategies into sharper focus.
A second lesson is that attempts to develop theories of patronage need to incorporate variations in threats to political power. The debate over whether governments allocate patronage to swing or core voters discussed by Stokes is thus not very useful without a discussion of political context, as is increasingly suggested by the literature. For instance, in Uganda neither the core nor the swing voter hypotheses do a good job at predicting district creation; 74 and there is similar evidence that countryspecific institutional factors like executive dominance and center-local ties, rather than the swing/core voter hypotheses, account for patronage variation in contemporary South Korea. 75 Third, the evidence here suggests that a focus on ethnic patronage may miss much of the variation in patronage across time and space. While ethnic patronage has been prominent in all six regimes examined here, arguably none of the four previous regimes were overthrown due to an overconcentration of patronage among the president's ethnic group, and in contemporary Rwanda and Uganda the most important political opposition currently comes from the same ethnic groups as Kagame and Museveni. 76 In other words, future research on the role of patronage in regime survival may wish to examine in more detail how politicians distribute patronage to citizens from other ethnic groups rather than continue to focus on the redistribution of patronage within ethnic groups.
In the end, however, it is important that scholars continue to study the nature of patronage allocation across both time and space in order to better understand how and why governments employ a variety of patronage strategies. I can only hope that the evidence I have presented here will help to move us further towards this goal. 76 Uganda's most prominent opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, is a Munyankole like President Museveni. In Rwanda Kagame's main opposition has come from other Tutsi returnees within the RPF, including those who support the restoration of the monarchy. Cf. Sebastian Silva-Leander, "On the Danger and Necessity of Democratization: Trade-Offs Between Short-Term Stability and Long-Term Peace in Post-Genocide Rwanda," Third World Quarterly, 29 (December, 2008), 1601-1620.
Institutional Variable Option 1 Option 2 Geography
Center Periphery (Central Government Jobs) (Local Government Jobs)
Visibility
Invisible and Reversible Visible and Non-Reversible (Private Goods or "Spoils") (Club Goods or "Pork") 
Invisible and Reversible Visible and Non-Reversible (Private Goods or "Spoils") (Club Goods or "Pork")
